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ALTERNATIVE PASTS:
LEGAL LIBERALISM AND THE DEMISE OF THE 
DISALLOWANCE POWER
Robert C. Vipond*
Constitutional debate in Canada has come increasingly to center on different “vi­
sions” of the country and the “alternative futures”1 that these visions represent. 
It is often said that we are caught between an older view of political authority that 
vested sovereignty in Parliament and looked to Britain as the model, and a new 
one that seems to vest sovereignty in people, not governments, and consciously 
imitates the United States;2 between “our historic participatory model”3 that 
stresses the values of community and decentralized democratic participation, and 
an atomistic liberalism that stresses the protection of individual rights; between a 
definition of the scope of the country which seizes on the importance of regional 
identity, and a competing alternative which emphasizes the possibilities and rights 
of national citizenship.4 In short we live suspended uneasily between the spirit of 
the Charter of Rights and the Meech Lake Accord.
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But the debate about these “alternative futures,” as Charles Taylor calls 
them, is highly problematic because it is often ahistorical. By this I do not mean 
that the debate ignores history. On the contrary, the current discussion is usually 
set against the backdrop of the larger Canadian constitutional tradition, and its 
disputants typically couch their analysis in terms that are meant to show how our 
current situation either builds on the past or departs from it. The problem, rath­
er, is with the tendency to read the past through the lens ground by the present 
debate. And the problem - most clearly evident in Charles Taylor’s contribution 
to the McDonald Commission research series - is that in reconstructing the past, 
much of the complexity, subtlety and ambiguity of the Canadian constitutional 
tradition has been lost.
The stark dichotomies favoured in the current debate seem particularly in­
adequate as tools for understanding the debate that took place in the 1880s, large­
ly though not exclusively in Ontario, over use of the federal veto power of dis­
allowance. The attack on John A. Macdonald’s use of disallowance has long been 
considered one of the central episodes in the struggle for provincial rights. It is 
rightly viewed as a turning point in the development of Canadian federalism. But 
beyond its importance as an episode of constitutional history, the debate over dis­
allowance offers what is arguably the most illuminating context for examination of 
the larger ideological or theoretical assumptions that animated late-nineteenth- 
century legal and constitutional discourse in Canada - a perspective I will call 
“legal liberalism.” This conception of legal liberalism does not square as easily 
with the terms of the current constitutional debate as Taylor and others suggest. 
To that extent its recovery may serve as a corrective to the present debate by 
revealing an “alternative past” from which to view these “alternative futures” 
afresh.
I
Disallowance is a veto power, modelled after the imperial power of the same 
name, which allows the federal government to strike down or nullify acts of a 
provincial legislature within one year of passage.5 It is impossible to discern with 
absolute clarity the “original intentions” of the Fathers of Confederation with 
regard to disallowance. “The Fathers” were not a monolithic group. For that 
reason alone, generalizations about their intentions are dangerous and probably 
misleading. It is clear, however, that at least some of the leading Confedera- 
tionists supported the veto power for the same reason that James Madison sup­
ported a national veto over state legislation in the U.S. Simply put, they believed 
that disallowance would be a useful tool in protecting individuals and minorities 
from unjust, tyrannical or discriminatory provincial legislation.
The argument that disallowance could be used to protect minorities against 
tyrannical provincial majorities was made with special vigour by the likes of John
^Constitution Act, 1867, sections 56,90.
Rose - representatives from the English-speaking, Protestant community in 
Quebec. Rose spoke openly of his constituents’ apprehension that a legislature 
dominated by those of another “race and religion” might attempt to manipulate 
the electoral laws so as to reduce the influence of the English Protestant minority 
in Quebec. Rose entertained no such apprehension, however. “If the Local 
Legislature exercised power in any such unjust manner, it would be competent for 
the General Government to veto its action - even although the power be one 
which is declared to be absolutely vested in the Local Government.
This view was not confined to Anglo-Quebeckers. Alexander Mackenzie, one 
of the leading Upper Canadian Reformers and Canada’s second prime minister, 
thought inclusion of disallowance “necessary in order that the General Govern­
ment may have control over the proceedings of the local legislatures to a certain 
extent.”7 George Brown suggested that the power of disallowance would provide 
aggrieved individuals or groups with an “appeal” against “injustice” that had been 
perpetrated by a local legislature.* And John A. Macdonald seems to have un­
derstood that disallowance would act as the linchpin between centralism and the 
protection of individuals and minorities. “Under the Confederation scheme,” he 
is reported to have said at Quebec in 1864, “we shall.. .  be able to protect the mi­
nority by having a powerful central government.”9 Of course it is easy to make 
too much of this evidence, for the fact remains that most of the settlement’s sup­
porters in the Canadian assembly apparently had no clear idea as to how the veto 
power would be exercised. Still, it is not insignificant that the leaders of the 
Great Coalition seem to have agreed that the disallowance power would or could 
be used as an instrument to protect individual and minority rights.
It is ironic, therefore, that when the federal government came to exercise the 
power of disallowance in the first years after 1867, it was guided neither by the 
bare and unqualified words of the British North America Act nor by the suggestion 
that the veto should be used to protect provincial abridgement of individual or 
minority rights. And it is doubly ironic that the person primarily responsible for 
limiting the scope of the veto power and directing it away from rights questions 
was John A. Macdonald.
As Minister of Justice in his own first cabinet, Macdonald took it upon him, 
self to circulate a report among the provincial governments that explained under 
what circumstances his government would feel compelled to veto provincial laws. 
Macdonald’s report was repetitive and sometimes unclear, but the fundamental 
point - that the practice of disallowance would be more limited than the almost
6Canada, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the Brit­
ish North American Provinces (Quebec; Hunter, Rose and Company, 1865) at 407. (Hereafter cited 
as Confederation Debates.)
1 Confederation Debates at 433.
iIbid. at 108.
9G. P. Browne, ed., Documents on the Confederation of British North America (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1969) at 95.
unqualified words of the B.NA. allowed - was unambiguous. Basically, Mac­
donald indicated that the federal government would consider it appropriate to ex­
ercise the veto only in the following cases: 1) if provincial acts were “altogether il­
legal or unconstitutional”; 2) if they were “illegal or unconstitutional in part”; 3) 
“in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, as clashing with the legislation of the general 
parliament”; or 4) in cases “affecting the interests of the Dominion generally.” 
Nor was disallowance to be used in every case falling under these headings. It 
was “of importance,” Macdonald said, that provincial legislation “should be inter­
fered with as little as possible,” and he therefore promised that disallowance 
would be exercised “with great caution” and “only in cases where the law and the 
general interests of the Dominion imperatively demand it.”11
Why did Macdonald emphasize the disallowance limitations and what pre­
cisely did these categories entail? One answer to the question is surely that Mac­
donald was simply adapting imperial rules for domestic use. By the time of Con­
federation the use of the imperial power of disallowance was quite strictly limited. 
It was generally recognized by the time this report was written and circulated m
1868 that the imperial authorities would not interfere with Canadian legislation 
unless it manifestly affected imperial interests. That limitation had allowed the 
Canadians to legislate quite freely on internal Canadian matters. Since the feder­
al power of disallowance was explicitly modelled after the imperial power of the 
same name, it made some sense to restrict the federal power of disallowance m 
essentially the same way.
Yet Macdonald’s reference to the imperative of “the law and the general in­
terests of the Dominion” suggests another answer to that question that has little 
to do with the now familiar imperial analogue. For what Macdonald seems to 
have realized is that the B.NA. Act gave the provincial governments a legal claim 
to legislate “exclusively” on those matters enumerated under Section 92, as it 
gave the federal government the “exclusive” right to legislate on matters listed in 
Section 91.12 And he seems to have concluded from this that the legal right to 
disallow provincial legislation simply could not be exercised in an unqualified way 
without ^"dp.rmining the provincial legislatures’ legal right to legislate exclusively 
on those matters listed under Section 92. His report of 1868 was thus an attempt 
to formulate rules for the exercise of disallowance that would balance the veto 
power as a tool of national consolidation with the provinces’ legal claim to exclu­
sive power; it was an attempt to reconcile a tension or conflict in the terms of the 
B.NA. Act itself and to vindicate his claim that the Confederation settlement was 
indeed “a happy medium” between two extremes.13
10Macdonald’s report, dated 8 June 1868, is reproduced in W. E. Hodgins (comp.), Correspondence, 
Reports of the Ministers of Justice, and Orders in Council upon the Subject of Dominion and Prwrnctal 
Legislation, 1867-1895 (Ottawa: 1896) at 61-62. (Hereafter cited as Dominion and Provincial Legisla­
tion.)
llIbid.
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Macdonald seems to have believed that a workable balance could be 
achieved if disallowance were used exclusively as a jurisdictional veto. Within the 
confines of Section 92, the provincial legislatures enjoyed the exclusive right to 
legislate, and Macdonald strongly implied that on such matters clearly within 
provincial jurisdiction the federal government had no business interfering. There 
were two corollaries and one exception to this basic rule. First, Macdonald clear­
ly understood that the provincial legislatures might attempt to legislate on matters 
not covered by the list of subjects in Section 92. In this case they would be guilty 
of overstepping the boundaries of their jurisdiction or, worse yet, encroaching on 
the subjects reserved to the federal government. In such cases they would be 
legislating “illegally” or “unconstitutionally,” and Macdonald was quick to say 
that if this occurred the federal government had every right, consistent with the 
idea of provincial autonomy itself, to veto provincial legislation that was in this 
sense ultra vires. Second, Macdonald seems to have realized Hiaf even if the 
provincial legislature were acting within its jurisdiction, its action might collide 
with a legitimate federal law. Macdonald was almost certainly thinking here of 
the areas of agriculture and immigration which Section 95 of the B.NA. Act itself 
designated as matters of “concurrent” jurisdiction. On these subjects the federal 
and provincial governments would share legislative responsibility, and Macdonald 
seems to have realized that their policies could well be inconsistent. Thus the 
veto power here would simply serve the purpose performed by the supremacy 
clause of Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution. In the case of conflict between feder­
al and provincial legislation on the subject of immigration or agriculture, federal 
legislation could be made to prevail
These specified areas of concurrent jurisdiction did not exhaust the possibility 
of policy collision, however. Macdonald seems to have realized that provincial 
acts might still impinge on national policy without actually exceeding provincial 
jurisdiction. Macdonald’s language was vague on this point, but one can under­
stand his fears. He perhaps foresaw the possibility, already anticipated by the of­
ficial categories of concurrent jurisdiction, that federal and provincial jurisdiction 
would to some extent overlap. And he perhaps concluded that in such cases fed­
eral policy had to be protected from provincial acts that were perfectly “legal,” 
that is within provincial jurisidiction, but which nevertheless conflicted with feder­
al policy. He perhaps realized as well that legitimate provincial legislation might 
occasionally have to yield to what Parliament considered to be some greater na­
tional purpose even if that purpose could not easily be fit under any of the 
enumerated headings of Section 91. In any case, he seems to have thought it 
necessary to provide the federal government with a third line of defence again^ 
provincial legislation, the disallowance of provincial legislation which “affects the 
mterest of the whole Dominion.”
The obvious difficulty with this third category was its vagueness; for, after all, 
m what did the “interests of the Dominion generally” consist? If the national in­
terest were used routinely as a pretext for disallowing provincial legislation which 
was perfectly legitimate save for its incompatibility with the national interest, the 
power of disallowance would destroy the very balance that Macdonald claimed to
want to maintain. This is one of the reasons that the power of disallowance be­
came especially controversial in the 1880s.
Yet at the time Macdonald circulated his report, in 1868, these fears were 
little mentioned. The rules laid down by Macdonald in the year after Confedera­
tion received broad bi-partisan support, and the report served as the standard for 
use of disallowance for some twenty years because Conservatives and Liberals 
alike accepted what they understood to be Macdonald’s basic premise: that the 
federal government could of right disallow provincial acts, but only for jurisdic­
tional reasons. What precisely was included in the term jurisdiction was of course 
open to question; what was excluded by it was not. For if Macdonald s working 
assumption was that the provincial governments must generally be allowed to act 
freely within their jurisdiction, it followed that disallowance could not be used 
routinely to protect individual or minority rights as long as the provincial govern­
ments stayed within provincial jurisdiction. Nor, by the same reasoning, could the 
federal cabinet act to strike down provincial legislation that it found imprudent, 
unwise, unappealing or downright obnoxious as long as the legislation fell within 
the provincial sphere. From Macdonald’s perspective, it was crucial that the fed­
eral government have the capacity to act quickly to prevent the provincial govern­
ments from thwarting the task of building the nation. Macdonald was nothing if 
not a centralist, and disallowance seemed useful, indeed crucial, in protecting the 
federal government’s expansive authority from the depredations of the provinces. 
If the cost of wielding the veto power in this way was to allow the provincial 
governments to act freely within the limited ambit granted to them by the Con­
stitution, it was a price Macdonald was quite willing to pay. That was Mac­
donald’s way of reconciling centralization with the federal principle.14
At the very least, this interpretation of the guidelines is consistent with the 
way in which Macdonald in fact exercised the power of disallowance in the first 
government. As Minister of Justice from 1867 to 1872, Macdonald recommended 
disallowance of five acts, all of them on jurisdictional grounds. Thus when the 
Ontario and Quebec legislatures attempted to confer on themselves par­
liamentary privileges and immunities Macdonald argued that provincial legisla­
tures lacked the “competence” under sections 92-95 of the B.AL4. Act to enact 
such legislation.15 A portion of the supply bill passed by the Ontario legislature in
1869 was disallowed because, in Macdonald’s words, it was not “within the com­
14My interpretation of Macdonald’s guidelines for the use of disallowance differs from the conven­
tional interpretation championed by Eugene Forsey, “Disallowance of Provincial Acts, Reservation 
of Provincial Bills, and Refusal of Assent by Lieutenant-Governors Since 1867’ (1938) 4 The Cana­
dian Journal of Economics and Political Science at 47-39; and J. R. Mallory, Social Credit and the 
Federal Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), c. 2. Both want to argue 
that when Macdonald referred to “illegal” and “unconstitutional” acts in the report of 1868 he did so 
in order to distinguish them. They suggest that by “illegal” Macdonald was referring to acts that 
were ultra vires or beyond the jurisdiction of the provinces, whereas by “unconstitutional” he meant 
to bring within the prie of disallowance acts that were unsound, unreasonable or violations of prop­
erty rights. My interpretation accords with that of Gérard La Forest, Disallowance and Reservation 
of Provincial Legislation (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1955) at 37.
^odgins, Dominion and Provincial Legislation at 83.
petence” of the provincial legislature to pay judges’ salaries; this was a federal 
responsiblity. An act of the Nova Scotia legislature empowering the Halifax dty 
police court to sentence juvenile offenders was held to be ultra vires on the 
grounds that it was a matter of the criminal law, on which the federal government 
had exclusive power to legislate.17 And another act of the Nova Scotia legislature, 
this one regulating pilotage, was also disallowed for encroaching on federal juris­
diction.18 J
Macdonald’s inaction is arguably even more revealing than his action in this 
regard. On several occasions in those first years he received petitions from 
citizens who claimed some grievance against a provincial legislature, and who ap­
pealed to Ottawa in the hopes that the federal government would disallow the of­
fending act. The most notable of these petitions centred on the will of a certain 
Goodhue, the terms of which had been changed by an act of the Ontario legisla­
ture after the man’s death. The original will favoured the man’s grandchildren, 
the revised will his children. The executor of the estate, presumably «<*ing 0n be­
half of the grandchildren, asked the federal government to disallow the act on the 
grounds that it was “unconstitutional, in depriving persons of rights and property 
without their consent, and without any compensation whatever.”19 Macdonald’s 
reply was succinct and blunt: “Petitions have been received for the disallowance 
of this Act, but as it is within the competence of the provincial legislature, the un­
dersigned recommends that it be left to its operation.”30
Macdonald adopted the same tack in deflecting the demand that the federal 
government disallow New Brunswick’s Common Schools Act of 1871. The act, it 
was feared, would effectively dismantle the de facto denominational school sys­
tem that had existed for some time in the province.21 When other attempts to 
block passage of the bill failed, Macdonald was asked to veto the law on the 
grounds - in Timothy Anglin’s words - that it “outraged, insulted and deprived 
[Catholics in New Brunswick] of their just rights and privileges.”22 Macdonald 
responded by explaining that while he had considerable sympathy for Angling 
cause, there was really very little he could do. While he was “very much at one” 
with Anglin in his support for minority educational rights, Macdonald reiterated
16Ibid. at 83,93.
11 Ibid. at 472.
l*Ibid. at 476.
l9Ibid. at 97.
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University of Toronto Press, 1982), c. 5.
“ Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, at 198-199 (29 April 1872).
that the only question to be decided “was whether according to ‘the British North 
America Act, 1867,’ the Legislature of New Brunswick had exceeded its powers.’’ 
The federal government, Macdonald continued, could only be concerned with the 
legality of a provincial law, not with its wisdom or fairness. If it were otherwise, 
parliamentarians would “set up their own judgment against the solemn decision 
of a Province in a matter entirely within the control of that Province”; and that 
would make them guilty of a “violent wrench of the Constitution.” Dis­
allowance, in short, was meant and used in the first years after Confederation to 
reach jurisdictional questions only.25
Nor was this understanding of the use of disallowance peculiar to Macdonald 
or Conservative administrations. The question of provincial rights in Canada is 
often treated as a partisan dispute in which Liberals defended provincial 
autonomy as uncompromisingly as Conservatives supported central domination. 
Yet there was little dispute about the principles that should guide the exercise of 
disallowance, at least through the 1870s. The Liberal government of Alexander 
Mackenzie, which held office from 1873-1878, accepted disallowance as a legiti­
mate constitutional instrument for striking down provincial legislation that ex­
ceeded its jurisdiction. Indeed, the Mackenzie government used the power rather 
more freely than Macdonald had. It disallowed eighteen provincial laws in its 
five-year tenure, as opposed to just five over a comparable period by the first 
Macdonald administration.26 With Macdonald, the Liberal ministers responsible 
expressly restricted their use of the power to cases in which a jurisdictional viola­
tion could be found.27
aIbid. at 199.
*Ibid. at 201.
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Provincial Legislation at 274). In the other, an Ontario statute which legalized the union of several 
Presbyterian churches against the wishes of some of the parishioners, Blake said simply that he need 
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of an act did not provide sufficient grounds for disallowance, and no provincial act was disallowed 
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II
During the first decade of Confederation there was no serious partisan disagree­
ment about the general rules governing the exercise of disallowance. The opposi­
tion, whether Liberal or Conservative, sometimes quibbled with the government’s 
use of the power in particular cases, but there was no disagreement about the 
general principle that the disallowance of provincial legislation was legitimate as 
long as, and only as long as, it was confined to jurisdictional questions. That con­
sensus was shattered in the 1880s. As the nation-building pretensions of the Mac­
donald government grew, so did its use of disallowance. As disallowance came to 
be used more broadly, so its legitimacy became more questionable and the debate 
surrounding it more partisan.
The growing controversy over use of disallowance came to a head in 1881 
when the Macdonald government struck down Ontario’s Rivers and Streams Act. 
The dispute centred on an act of the Ontario legislature which declared that ali 
persons have the right to float logs down Ontario waterways. In addition, the 
legislation stipulated how those who had invested time and money in improving 
these waterways were to be compensated for their efforts by those who benefitted 
from the improvements. The law had been passed in part to resolve a dispute be­
tween Peter McLaren, who had widened a tributary of the Ottawa River and 
Boyd Caldwell, a logger whose attempts to use the widened river had been 
thwarted by McLaren. McLaren complained that the Ontario law deprived him 
of his property rights. Having at considerable expense transformed a stream that 
was unnavigable “in a state of nature” into a small river, McLaren maintained 
that he had certain proprietary rights, among them the absolute right to decide 
who could use the river and at what price.28 He therefore petitioned the federal 
government to have the law disallowed.
As Caldwell, whose political connections were to the Liberal party, was able 
to get the ear of the Liberal government in Ontario, so McLaren, a Conservative, 
was successful in persuading the Macdonald government to strike down the 
Ontario law. It is a sign both of the depth of partisan feeling and constitutional 
moment that when it came time to explain the reasons for the disallowance, John
A. Macdonald himself took responsibility for writing the official report. Mac­
donald concentrated in his report, as McLaren had in his petition, on the effect of 
the Rivers and Streams Act on property rights. “The effect of the Act,” Mac­
donald asserted, “seems to be to take away the use of his property from one per­
son and give it to another, forcing the owner, practically, to become a toll-keeper 
against his will, if he wishes to get any compensation for being deprived of his 
rights.” He continued:
I think the power of the local legislatures to take away the rights of one man and
vest them in another, as is done by this Act, is exceedingly doubtful, but assum­
ing that such right does, in strictness, exist, I think it devolves upon this govem-
28Hodgins, Dominion and Provincial Legislation at 174.
ment to see that such power is not exercised, in flagrant violation of private 
rights and natural justice, especially when, as in this case, in addition to interfer­
ing with private rights in the way alluded to, the Act overrides a decision of a 
court of competent jurisdiction.
“On the whole,” he concluded, “I think the Act should be disallowed.”®
Macdonald’s defence of his disallowance of the Rivers and Streams Act was a 
turning point in the development of the provincial rights movement in Ontario in 
that it provoked the first concerted attack on the veto power itself. The dis­
allowance of the Ontario Act, first exercised in 1881 but repeated each time the 
Ontario legislature repassed it, became an essential element of the struggle lor 
provincial autonomy for several reasons. It was the first occasion m which dis­
allowance had been used against Ontario to strike down an act deariy within 
provincial jurisdiction. That is, it was the first time Macdonald had strayed from 
the guidelines he had set down for the use of disallowance. Adam Crooks, üie 
Attorney General for Ontario, made the most of Macdonald’s apparent in­
consistency when, in his reply to Macdonald’s report, he pointed out that the dis­
allowance of legislation on the grounds of injustice flew in the face both of the 
rules of 1868 and subsequent practice. In light of Macdonald’s own actions (m 
the Goodhue will case for instance) the disallowance of the Rivers and Steams 
Act was “singular,” “exceptional,” and incompatible with the view that the federal 
and provincial governments are “alike sovereign in their nature, within the limits 
of the subjects assigned to each respectively.”30 The federal govenunent had 
done precisely what Macdonald himself had said it must not do. It had assumed 
the responsiblity of reviewing “the provisions of a provincial Act within (the pro­
vince’s) competency.” In so doing, the Macdonald government had failed to 
respect “the responsibility and sovereign authority of the provincial legislature in 
considering, m aking and framing all such laws respecting property and civil rights 
within the province, and the other subjects exclusively assigned to it by the Con­
federation Act.. .  .”31
The Mowat Government’s protest was joined by Liberal Members of Parlia­
ment and the Liberal press. Edward Blake reminded Macdonald of the 1868 
guidelines, pointed out the evident inconsistency of his action in the Rivers and 
Streams case, and returned to the general principle on which the original 
guidelines had been based. “It would impair the Federal principle, and injurious­
ly affect the autonomy of the institutions of our several Provinces,” Blake argued, 
“were this power to be exercised on subjects which are within the exclusive com­
petence of the Local Legislatures, on the ground that in the opinion of His Ex­
cellency’s advisers, or of the Parliament, any such legislation is wrong. The 
Toronto Globe put it more pithily:
*Ibid. at 178.
*Ibid. at 183.
31Ibid. at 185. See also London Advertiser, (28 April 1882).
^Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, at 908-909 (14 April 1882). In addition, see the 
speech by Guthrie on the same day at 896-897.
Never once for fifteen years has the Dominion interfered, never at all has there 
been any cause for interference. And now, for the first time in the histoiy of the 
Confederation, the Dominion has asserted a right to interfere in matters within 
our own concern under the Constitution, within our own province. An Act deal­
ing with our own rivers and streams has been flung bade in our face, and the 
whole force of the Union used to prevent its becoming law.33
“The interference,” proclaimed the Globe, “was in fact a violent invasion of 
Provincial rights perpetrated by the Dominion Premier.”34
Macdonald was unpersuaded by these criticisms, but his parliamentary 
rejoinder differed in one crucial respect from the explanation contained 'm the of­
ficial disallowance report sent to the Ontario government; a difference which, of­
fered in the spirit of conciliation, had the unexpected effect of deepening his op­
ponents' distrust. The principle that guided the exercise of disallowance, Mac­
donald maintained before Parliament, was simply that the “independence of 
every legislature should be protected unless there is a constitutional reason 
against it.”35 Sir John was compelled to admit that the Rivers and Streams Act, as 
a matter respecting property and civil rights, was probably within the competence 
of the Ontario provincial legislature. It was neither “illegal” nor “unconstitu­
tional” in the precise sense in which he used the terms in the 1868 guidelines, and 
he as much as admitted that he could not defend the federal government's deci­
sion to strike down the act on these conventional grounds. But according to Mac­
donald, the act was still objectionable - if not in the narrow then in the broad 
sense of the term jurisdiction. The principle of provincial autonomy was not dis­
positive in this case because the Rivers and Streams Act “violated distinctly the 
most important” of the conditions set out in the 1868 report; that is, it affected 
“the general interests” of the Dominion.36 Where Macdonald at first argued that 
the federal government had acted to protect private rights and the public interest, 
he now shifted ground to argue that the federal government had acted to protect 
private rights and the national interest. The difference was meant to save his ac­
tion from the Mowat Government’s trenchant criticism by m aking the grounds for 
the clef’s disallowance consistent with the guidelines of 1868.
In 1873 Macdonald had rejected the suggestion that the New Brunswick 
schools question affected “the general interests” of the country. He now strained 
to show how an act passed to resolve a dispute between two lumbermen could be 
called a matter of national importance that required nullifying legislation th a t 
everyone, even Macdonald, admitted fell within provincial jurisdiction:
^Toronto Globe, (24 Januaiy 1883).
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We were protecting a man from great wrong, from a great loss and injury, from a 
course which, if pursued, would destroy the confidence of the whole world in the 
law of the land. What property would be safe? What man would make an invest­
ment in this country? Would capitalists come to Canada if the rights of property 
were taken away, as was attempted under this Bill? This was one of the grounds 
on which in that paper of mine, of 1867 (sic), I dedared that, in my opinion, all 
Bills should be disallowed if they affected general interests. Sir, we are not half a 
dozen Provinces. We are one great Dominion. If we commit an offence against 
the laws of property, or any other atrocity in legislation, it will be widely known..
The dispute between McLaren and Caldwell, according to Macdonald, was a mat­
ter of no mean significance. The protection of property rights and their uniform 
enjoyment had become a national necessity. At stake were the reputation, the 
prosperity, perhaps even the whole future of Canada.
What is significant here is not the tortuousness of the argument - that is ob­
vious enough. What is significant is that in attempting to defend the Rivers and 
Streams disallowance on the broadest grounds of national interest, Macdonald s 
almost desperate attempt to show that this was in some sense a jurisdictional 
question backfired badly. Instead of propitiating the autonomists by showing that 
this veto was exercised according to the well understood rules of 1868, his defence 
of the Rivers and Streams veto almost inadvertently led the autonomists to ques­
tion the rules themselves. And once the subject had been opened, they were 
quick to conclude that any use of disallowance - even for jurisdictional reasons - 
threatened the integrity of provincial legislation and the federal principle in a way 
that could not be tolerated.
The Rivers and Streams case thus recast fundamentally the debate over dis­
allowance. The provincial autonomists had argued for the first fifteen years^of 
Confederation that the disallowance power, when used as a jurisdictional veto “to 
guard (the federal government) against encroachments by the Provinces,” was 
consistent with the federal principle and the fundamental conventions of 
responsible, parliamentary self-government.38 Macdonald’s tortured defence of 
the Rivers and Streams veto forced the autonomists to reconsider this com­
promise. It demonstrated that as long as disallowance could be used legitimately 
and routinely to strike down provincial legislation on the pretext that a provincial 
act offended “the general interests of the Dominion,” it could be used agamst 
provincial legislation that clearly was intra vires the provincial government. The 
autonomists began to understand, in other words, that the great flaw in the power 
of disallowance was that it granted discretion to the federal government to 
determine whether legislation was jurisdictionally sound and consistent with the 
national interest. And they began to realize, equally, that as long as disallowance 
was controlled by someone like Macdonald, the definition of what was in the na­
2:1 Ibid. at 924.
^London Advertiser, (9 February 1883).
tional interest was almost infinitely expandable. If a question as parochial as the 
one at issue in the Rivers and Streams case could be construed as a matter of na­
tional importance, almost anything could; and as Macdonald came in the 1880s to 
disallow provincial laws more frequently on the shadowy grounds that they were 
inconsistent with the “national interest” the autonomists tumbled to the conclu­
sion that the power of disallowance had become a dangerous weapon in the 
Prime Minister’s larger plan of centralization.39
The Rivers and Streams case stood out larger than life to the provincial 
autonomists, in other words, because it made them see that as long as the federal 
government felt free to use the veto, it could fabricate dubious, indeed phony, 
jurisdictional claims to extend its own jurisdiction at the expense of legitimate 
provincial goals. Seen in this new light, Macdonald’s disallowance of the Rivers 
and Streams Act was not an isolated and discrete violation of his own guidelines, 
it was part of a larger attempt to create a centralized state. The federal govern­
ment had been given the power of disallowance, according to the London Ad­
vertiser, in order “to protect itself against encroachments, by the numerous 
Provincial Legislatures:
but it never was intended that the Federal Government should use this defensive 
power for aggressive purposes. It never was intended that a power conferred for 
the purpose of upholding its own jurisdiction should be employed to destroy the 
more ancient fabrics of the Provinces. But this is what is being done, and politi­
cal partizans in the press and in the Legislature are crying out agair^  centraliza­
tion at the very time they are defending by gross misrepresentation these un­
warrantable encroachments upon self-government in the Provinces. No cen­
tralization!40
What was at stake in the Rivers and Streams case, the Advertiser argued, “was not 
simply a matter of rivers and streams” nor even “a matter of private rights or the 
compensation to be given therefor.” What was at issue, rather, was “something 
above and beyond both,” namely “the right of the Province to enjoy the in­
estimable privilege of local self-government” on matters “within (its) own 
sphere. The autonomists had believed that their sphere of jurisdiction was pro­
tected by “a barrier of a superior law.”42 The Rivers and Streams episode 
demonstrated, to the contrary, that the federal government was prepared to 
tramj^e under foot the barriers which the principles of the Constitution im- 
P®*®1 _ The charge, in short, was not simply that Macdonald had applied his 
rules inconsistently, but that the rules were themselves flawed. Macdonald’s
«KM ïonür? ^  “neariy one-half of the thirty-eight Acts disallowed during this period (i.e. 
1881-1896) were vetoed on the g ro u n d  that they interfered with the railway policy of Canada” even 
though most were within provincial jurisdiction. See La Forest, Disallowance and Reservation at 58.
40London Advertiser, (7 February 1883).
41Toronto Globe, (24 January 1883).
42London Advertiser, (14 March 1883).
43Ibid, (10 December 1883).
policy of disallowance was “a death blow” aimed “at the Federal system, and the 
responsibility of the Provincial Ministry to the Local Legislature and electorate. 
That is why the Rivers and Streams case elicited such a fierce response.
Ill
The autonomists insisted on making the disallowance of the Rivers and Streams 
bill a major constitutional issue because it illustrated graphically that, however 
defined, a federal veto threatened provincial power and the larger idea of federal­
ism on which provincial power rested. But this summary still fails to capture the 
deepest strain of the autonomists’ objection to Macdonald’s use of disallowance. 
For if the Rivers and Streams episode was a turning point in the understanding 
and practice of disallowance in Canada, it is still more significant for the light it 
sheds on the broader intellectual context in which the provincial autonomists 
positioned themselves. As the foregoing passages suggest, the autonomists took 
issue with the Macdonald government’s use of disallowance not merely because it 
deviated from the established rules that were meant to govern and limit the use ot 
the veto power, nor simply because they came to believe that the veto power 
could not be reconciled with the federal principle under any circumstances. The 
more general and ultimately more serious claim, rather, was that disallowance 
was incompatible with the ideal of the rule of law and with the larger 
“transatlantic project” of liberal reform being earned on m the name of the rule 
of law.
In one respect there is nothing surprising about the autonomists’ emphasis on 
the rule of law. Most were lawyers turned politicians who, if nothing else, had a 
solid professional interest in asserting the importance of law. Most were com­
mitted to the view that politics was best studied and understood through the lens 
of constitutional politics and legal forms. Moreover, the ideology of the rule ot 
law was a crucial component of their imperialism. One of the basic claims for the 
superiority of the Empire and British civilization was its ancient and honourable 
tradition that arbitrary power must be curbed and that the rule of law is especially 
important in protecting liberty against tyranny. By the mid-Nmeteenth Century 
this view had been reduced to a common political slogan and a test of conven­
tional legitimacy. Certainly in Canada no mainstream politician would have dis­
sented from it.
In the late Nineteenth Century, however, the ideal of the rule of law came to 
be associated more precisely with a powerful intellectual movement of Anglo- 
American legal reform which attempted to show how a scientific understanding ot 
law could be put to the service of liberal ends. The spiritual home of this legal 
liberalism” (as it has been called) was in the universities, and while it ‘began to 
appear as early as 1850” it “became most conspicuously abundant in Anglo- 
American academic circles during the 1870s and 1880s”; that is, at^  precisely the 
moment the provincial rights movement was gaining momentum. In England
44Toronto Globe, (6 June 1881). ^
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the movement was centred at Oxford and came to be associated with Dicey, Pol­
lock, Anson, Salmond and Bryce; in the United States, it was most closely associ­
ated with Harvard and the efforts of Langdell, Holmes, Ames and Williston. In 
either case it profited from an extraordinary transatlantic collaboration among 
legal scholars who were also friends. There were, of course, many important dif­
ferences among such scholars, some of which reflected different national styles 
Mïî  Pr . ems’ others of which are more idiosyncratic and difficult to categorize. 
Still, it is possible to describe relatively easily, at least at the level of intellectual 
caricature, what united these various minds and what forms the core of legal lib­
eralism.46 6
The movement of legal liberalism was concerned with placing the law, and 
more specifically courts guided by scientific principles, in the service of individual 
liberty. As David Sugarman has pointed out, legal scholars like Dicey were much 
taken with John Stuart Mill’s celebration of creative individualism, and they took 
no less seriously than did Mill the problem of protecting individual autonomy ei­
ther from other individuals or from the state, or both.47 Given the apparently nat­
ural predilection for individuals and political bodies to want to expand their 
power at the expense of others, the crucial political problem for late-Nineteenth- 
Century liberalism was to set clear limits or boundaries within which each actor is 
sovereign, that is free to will without interference from others. The task for liber­
alism was to distinguish public from private, state from society, other-regarding 
from self-regarding behaviour. In short, the irreducible liberal aim was to maxi­
mize hberty by keeping each actor within appropriate and assigned limit*
The distinctive contribution of legal scholarship in the late Nineteenth 
Century was to suggest that the law contained objective principles that could be 
used to enforce the boundaries or limits of individual or state behaviour. Rather 
than entrusting the protection of liberty to the discretion of political officials 
whose judgment could be distorted by self-interest in one of its many forms; rath­
er than making the protection of rights a matter of statesmanlike balancing of in­
dividual and public considerations, the view of legal liberalism was that the 
boundaries should be settled, deduced scientifically from a number of general 
principles, and applied objectively by the courts.
The greatest champion of this vision of the rule of law was A.V. Dicey, whose 
Law of the Constitution (1885) furnished an extraordinarily influential interpreta­
tion of the systematic, purposeful development of the rule of law in England 
Dicejrs story of the triumph of the rule of law in England was unapologetically 
nationalistic: the British story stood in stark contrast to the baleful decline of the 
rule of law m France. Yet for all his anglophilia, even Dicey seems to have been
North Carolina Press, 1983) at 69.
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willing to admit that the rule of law (and from that the rule of courts) was most 
deeply entrenched not in Britain, but in the United States where the common law 
was supplemented by judicial review and by a legalistic conception of federalism. 
The European “americomania” that Dicey described as a correspondent for The 
Nation, and which he seems to have shared, was an entirely apt manifestation of 
legal liberalism.49
To the legal liberal, the beauty of the American conception of the rule of law 
was its versatility in describing and explaining a whole universe of legal and politi­
cal relationships between individuals and the state. The premise of legal liber­
alism, as Duncan Kennedy has noted, “was that the legal system consisted of a set 
of institutions, each of which had the traits of a legal actor” and eadi of which 
was comparable or even convertible one to the other. “Each institution had 
been delegated by the sovereign people a power to carry out its will, which was 
absolute within but void outside its sphere.” “The physical boundaries between 
dtizens” were in this sense “like those between states,” and “the non-physical 
division of jurisdiction over a given object between legislature and ctfizen washke 
that between state and federal governments.” Moreover, eadi legal actor had to 
worry that this sphere of sovereignty would be challenged, violated or com­
promised by another actor. Precisely “(b)ecause all the actors held formally 
identical powers of absolute dominion, one could speak equally of trespass by 
neighbor against neighbor, by state against dtizen, and by citizen against state. 
And precisely because the problem of setting and maintaining boundaries was the 
same throughout the system, the task of the judge was “identical whether the oc­
casion of its exercise was a quarrel between neighbors, between sovereigns, or be­
tween dtizen and legislature.” The task of the law - be it the common law, the 
law of federalism or judicial review under the Bill of Rights - was to prevent usur­
pation and preserve rights.
This understanding of the purpose and function of the law was developed 
largely in the universities, but it cannot be overstressed that it was at its base a 
project to reform the way in which the law was actually applied by lawyers and 
courts. The historical importance of this conception of legal liberalism consists m 
its infrif"™ in shaping political and legal practice in the 1880s, 1890s and beyond. 
In England, for example, Dice/s understanding of the rule of law was a crucial 
element in the political debate over the legitimacy of administrative tribunals and 
the regulatory state. In the United States, this conception had great appeal tothe 
Supreme Court in what has been called the laissez-faire era, that is roughly 1880- 
1930. In Canada, the least studied of the three jurisdictions, this vision of the rule
^  this Mint see Sugarman, “Leg»l Boundaries” at 109-110; and H. A. Tultoch, “Changing British 
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of law was adapted for practice in a rather pure, albeit inchoate, form by the 
provincial rights movement.
The Canadian legal community contributed little to the general or theoreti­
cal elaboration of legal liberalism in England and the United States, but it fol­
lowed developments in both places closely. In a few important cases the external 
influence in shaping the Canadian legal mind was quite direct and explicit. The 
case of David Mills stands out. Member of Parliament for some thirty years, 
newspaper editor, law professor, Minister of Justice under Laurier, associate jus­
tice of the Supreme Court of Canada - Mills was one of the leading defenders of 
provincial rights in Ontario in the formative period after Confederation. Mills is 
especially important for understanding the larger assumptions behind the provin- 
cialist movement because he developed a theory of provincial autonomy that was 
arguably unparalleled in English Canada. It is by no means coincidental tW  
Mills learned his law at the University of Michigan under one of the great mid­
century systematizes of American law, Thomas Cooley. Through Cooley and 
others, Mills was introduced directly to a system of law that anticipated many of 
the core concepts of legal liberalism, and he kept abreast of American legal de­
velopments thereafter.
In most of the other cases, the foreign influence was less direct but scarcely 
less important. American cases were cited frequently in Ontario courts well be­
fore Confederation,52 and the names of Story, Kent and others cropped up not in­
frequently m the provincialists’ defence of provincial autonomy.53 More typically 
however, especially from the 1880s on, Canadians looked to English law for guid­
ance and to English lawyers for authority.54 The autonomists had read Dicey55 
admired Bryce and generally attempted to keep astride of developments in 
English law.
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The provincial autonomists were quick to realize that the doctrine of legal 
liberalism provided a congenial framework for understanding their own experi­
ences with and hopes for federalism. For autonomists like Mills, the B.NA. Act 
was a “superior law,” a “constitution” which divided legislative jurisdiction into 
two independent “spheres” of power which “are mutually exclusive.” Within 
each sphere, therefore, each government was “sovereign” or “supreme,” subject 
only to the will of its electorate. If the federal government attempted to act on a 
matter within provincial jurisdiction, it was in effect “trespassing” on another 
government’s property. “So far as the Provinces continue their autonomy as Pro­
vinces ” the London Advertiser concluded, “the Federal Government has no more 
authority than it has over the affairs of the State of New York.”58 “The Provinces 
for Provincial purposes are not in the Union. For all these exclusive purposes, 
they are as much out of the Union as if no Union existed.”39 So understood, the 
defence of provincial autonomy against Macdonald’s centralizing schemes be­
came by the mid-1880s a major plank of the Liberal Party’s platform, both nation­
ally and provindally.
Nor were the autonomists hesitant to trade on the conceptual similarities be­
tween federalism and liberalism. The purpose of federalism, after all, was to 
preserve the “freedom,” “autonomy,” “independence,” indeed the “rights” of the 
individual provinces from other governments in much the same way as the object 
of the liberal state was to protect the rights of individuals from overbearing 
governmental power. The autonomists were quite aware of the rhetorical pos­
sibilities of describing provincial autonomy as a form of liberalism, and they made 
the most of the analogy between provincial and individual rights, between federal­
ism and liberalism.
Thus David Mills, who in addition to leading the Liberal attack on Mac­
donald in Parliament wrote most of the provindalist editorials for the London 
Advertiser, explained to his readers that, within the sphere of their jurisdiction, the 
provinces had the right to do what they pleased so long as it did not encroach 
“upon the rights of others.”60 That qualification understood (and it is an excep­
tion that again reflects Mills’ liberalism), the provincial legislatures were free to 
act as they pleased. They were as free, that is, as any rights-bearing individual m 
a liberal state.
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Mills drew out the implications of the analogy explicitly. The federal govern­
ment, he argued, had no more right to second-guess the wisdom of an act that 
was within provincial jurisdiction than the state had a right to tell citizens what re­
ligious beliefs they must hold, what foods they should eat, what colour clothes 
they should wear, or what crops they must plant:
We go to the farmer, and we find him cultivating his fields in a way which we 
think a system of scientific agriculture does not warrant. We tell him that the 
prosperity of the country depends upon the prosperity of each individual, and 
that the wrongheadedness of himself and hundreds of others are interfering with 
the general well-being of the country. We call in some one else of our own way 
of thinking who expresses similar opinions. He replies, “I am cultivating my own 
lands; upon them I am master of my own actions; in their cultivation my judg­
ment and not yours must prevail, because I, and not you, have exclusive jurisdic­
tion here. It is possible I may err, but I don’t think you are infallible, and since 
the judgment of somebody must prevail, the law which gives me exclusive control 
here says that it is my judgment and not yours which shall be preferred. It is 
your privilege to give me advice, but it is not your right to give me commands.”61
'Hie idea that the state had a right to tell individuals how to act or behave within 
that sphere of individual autonomy was, from this perspective, simply in­
defensible. “The most absolute Government that the world has ever known never 
ventured to carry out in minute detail any such political theory,” and nothing 
could justify it if it tried.62 ‘‘It may be wrong to invest money in a steamboat in­
stead of a farm, he argued in another version, “but these are wrongs based upon 
the rights of a man to do what he pleases with his own ~ the right of p re fe rring  
his own discretion to the discretion of his neighbor.”63 These illustrations all oc­
curred m the context of Mills’ attempts to explain why Macdonald’s use of the 
disallowance power was wrong. As individuals have rights to do as they please 
consistent with the rights of others, so too the “Local Legislature has the power 
to do as it chooses, so long as it does not interfere with the corresponding rights 
of others.’ And just as the state has no right to tell the farmer how to plant his 
crops, so ‘(n)either Sir John Macdonald nor any other outside party has any right 
to substitute their judgment for the judgment of those to whom the constitution 
has entrusted the matter.”65
The analogy between federalism and liberalism was useful, in other words 
for explaining the autonomists’ growing discontent with the Macdonald adminis­
tration. The protection of rights turned on the strict maintenance of the bound­
aries that separated individual from individual, state from individual and, in feder­
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alism, state from state. For the provinces to enjoy their rights, each government, 
federal and provincial, had to “keep within the boundaries drawn by the constitu­
tion” just as the state had to recognize the boundaries of legitimate public power 
if individual rights were to be maintained.66 The difficulty in federal Canada, ac­
cording to the autonomists, was that the Macdonald government had shown scant 
regard for these jurisdictional boundaries and for the provincial rights they pro­
tected. Nowhere was this clearer to the autonomists than in the controversy over 
disallowance, and that is why it became a rallying point. The Rivers and Streams 
case was interpreted as a grave threat to provincial rights because it signalled the 
federal government’s intention to “interfere” with, “violate,” “trespass” upon, 
“invade ” “plunder” and “usurp” provincial rights. As long as the exercise of dis­
allowance was considered acceptable, it was subject to the “treachery,” “vindic­
tiveness” and “intrigue” of a Prime Minister trying to “impose his will upon un­
willing provinces.67
As the autonomists viewed the problem of disallowance within the context of 
the rule of law, so they looked to it to provide a solution. If the federal govern­
ment was «sing the veto power to impose its political will upon the provinces, 
then the remedy was to have “a dear, explicit amendment to our Constitution, 
which (would) put an end to the vetoing power of the Dominion Administra­
tion,”68 and which would leave the resolution of jurisdictional disputes “as m the 
neighboring republic, entirely to the courts.”69 Only this would “relieve the Local 
Legislature from all possible intrigue between the leader of the (provincial) Op­
position and his confederates in the Dominion Administration.”
Of course this was not the first time an amendment to do away with dis­
allowance had been suggested; Mills had objected to it as early as 1869. ** 
was only in the 1880s, with the theory of the rule of law and the practice of the 
Macdonald administration fresh in their minds, that it became fashionable to ad­
vocate the abolition of disallowance. David Mills used the editorial columns of 
the London Advertiser to advance the idea of abolishing disallowance formally; 
the Toronto Globe supported the idea of a constitutional amendment to jettison 
the veto;73 and Oliver Mowat made it the first item on the agenda of the first In- 
terprovincial Conference of provincial premiers in 1887. The federal govern-
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ment was obviously opposed to any such change, but this did not deter the 
autonomists from trying to convince the Imperial Parliament that the dis­
allowance power should be expunged from the B.NA. Act - even if that had to be 
done without the federal government’s consent. Even here the convertible cate­
gories of constitutional law and private law, federalism and contracts, proved a 
useful guide. The B.NA. Act, the autonomists urged, should be understood as a 
“contract” among the several provinces which collectively had agreed to delegate 
a specified set of legislative powers upon a federal government that, by the terms 
of the contract, they had created. As the federal government was a creation of 
the contract, not one of the contractées, it was legitimate to alter the terms of the 
contract without its consent.75
In any event the autonomists’ demands fell on deaf ears. Neither the federal 
government nor the imperial authorities took the provincial “compact theory” 
particularly seriously. Indeed the imperial authorities did not even pay the 
provincial premiers the courtesy of replying officially to the request. This failure 
however, served only to redouble their efforts. If they could not read dis­
allowance out of the B.NA. Act altogether, they could at least render it expend­
able. To that end, Edward Blake proposed an amendment to the Supreme Court 
Act, the object of which was to make judicial review a more attractive alternative 
to disallowance than it previously had been.76
Blake’s argument followed directly from the premises of legal liberalism. 
The idea of the federal principle, he argued, was to create two mutually exclusive 
compartments of legislative power in which “the sphere of the jurisdiction of the 
one is limited by the sphere of the jurisdiction of the other.”77 To allow the feder­
al government to strike down provincial legislation was in effect to allow “one of 
these two limited Governments.. .  (to) decide the extent of the limits, of what in
75p?r * “ ort ^ iled " “ lysis of the compact theory see Ramsay Cook, Provincial Autonomy, Mi­
nority Rights and the Compact Theory 1867-1921 (Queen’s Printer, 1969) c. 4.
f a k e ’s successful amendment strengthened the reference case procedure. The reference case pro­
vided a judicial alternative to disallowance that combined the expeditiousness associated with dis­
allowance with the appearance of neutrality associated with judicial proceedings. In fact, Riakr pro­
f i te d  the reference case procedure less as an alternative to disallowance than as a supplement to it. 
But most seem to have realized that with a more satisfactory reference procedure in place, there 
would be no need for disallowance. See the comments of the Conservative Minister of Justice, Sir 
John Thompson, who was responsible for administering the new procedure: “. . . if the court pro­
nounced (an act) to be unconstitutional it would be most absurd, and practically impossible, for the 
Minister of Justice to advise that it should be disallowed, after the highest tribunal had dfd dfd that
° Powere tlie Provincial Legislature.” House of Commons Debates (7 August 
1891) at 3587. Reference cases have since become an important feature of Canadian constitutional 
law whereas disallowance has passed into virtual disuse. Under the circumstances, it is not too much 
to connect the waxing of one with the waning of the other. Certainly there can be no question that 
at a more general level, judicial review has replaced disallowance as a form of federal boundary man­
agement. On reference cases in this early context, see Gerald Rubin, ‘The Nature, Use and Effect 
of Reference Cases in Canadian Constitutional Law” in W. R. Lederman, ed., The Courts and the 
Canadian Constitution (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964) at 220-248.
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a sense, is its rival government.”78 Disallowance thus permitted a “political exec­
utive” to discharge “a legal and a judicial function.”79 Understood as such, it vio­
lated one of the fundamental principles of Anglo-Saxon law, for it allowed the 
federal government to judge cases in whose outcome it had an interest. There 
was a sense, Blake argued, in which the act of disallowance therefore is the deci­
sion of a party in his own cause.”80 It would be far better to enlist “neutral, dig­
nified and judicial aid” in the enforcement of jurisdictional boundaries.81 It would 
be far preferable to leave the interpretation of the constitutional division of 
powers to those who are trained to see federal and provincial jurisdiction, in 
Mills’ memorable phrase, “as if they were separated by land marks visible to the 
eye.”82
On the surface, this concerted attack on disallowance triumphed impressive­
ly. The view that policing the boundaries between federal and provincial jurisdic­
tion is a “legal and judicial function” became dogma, and as dogma changed so 
practice was gradually altered. To be sure, the practice of disallowing provincial 
legislation did not disappear overnight, but by the early decades of this century 
the disallowance power had almost completely been replaced by judicial review. 
In of the historical record, it seems plausible to suppose that the power of 
disallowance became unusable by the early decades of this century because the 
crucial audiences - provincial premiers, federal cabinet ministers and certain por­
tions of the electorate - came to view the veto power as the autonomists wanted 
them to view it: as a violation of constitutional principle to which political costs 
were attached and for which there was a principled, that is judicial, alternative. 
This certainly seems to have been the attitude of Ernest Lapointe, Mackenzie 
King’s veteran Minister of Justice, who rose before the House of Commons in 
1937 to explain that as long as “the provincial legislatures feel that they are still 
supreme and sovereign within the sphere of their jurisdiction” it would be dif­
ficult for Ottawa to veto provincial acts.84 The very fact that disallowance has es­
sentially passed into desuetude suggests that the Mills-Blake-Lapointe view of 
disallowance remains dominant.
IV
Yet at a deeper level, the Millsian attack upon disallowance did not end the 
debate over disallowance so much as return it to its point of origin; and in doing 
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and minority rights that had been largely submerged in the 1880s and 1890s. To 
recall, a number of the leading Confederationists had assumed that disallowance 
would and should be used to protect individuals and minorities from tyrannical 
provincial legislation. As we have seen in detail, this view of disallowance was 
quickly repudiated both by Conservative and Liberal administrations, who 
preferred to use disallowance as a jurisdictional veto when they used it at all. As 
we have also seen, the debate over disallowance therefore quite quickly resolved 
itself into a debate about federalism and the integrity of provincial 
and their legislatures.
Mills* original contribution to this debate in the 1880s and early 1890s in­
advertently challenged the terms of the debate, for his contention that dis­
allowance violated the rule of law, and his analogy between individual and 
provincial rights, re-introduced the theme of individual rights and the problem for 
which disallowance had once been seen as the solution. Mills had meant to use 
the analogy between individual and provincial rights to strengthen the case for the 
complete and utter autonomy of local decision-making. But the analogy was only 
as strong as the object of the comparison was deep. In Mills’ view, the rights of 
the provinces were worthy of protection in the same way or to the extent that the 
rights of individuals were worthy of protection. To Mills the idea of rights pro­
tected by law was not simply a neat linguistic analogy which helped him to il­
lustrate the dangers of federal disallowance; it was, more fundamentally, a valu­
able and intrinsically worthwhile model of political organization. Mills found the 
rights analogy persuasive, in other words, because he believed not merely that 
provincial rights could be compared to individual rights, but because, as a liberal, 
he believed that individuals have rights.
The difficulty with the analogy between provincial and individual rights, 
therefore, is that it cut both ways. On the one hand, it reinforced the argument 
for provincial autonomy by providing an unassailable foundation for the integrity 
of provincial legislation. But the same association that strengthened the Haîm for 
provincial autonomy could be used just as easily to undercut it. For if the basis of 
the claim for provincial autonomy was its likeness or comparability to individual 
autonomy, could the consistent provincialist really sit idly by as a provincial legis­
lature violated the rights of its citizens? If the provincial autonomists were really 
committed to the rule of law as the bulwark of liberty, could they simply ignore it 
when a provincial legislature abridged the liberty of some of its citizens? And if 
they couldn’t, did not disallowance provide one means by which to thwart vicious 
provincial legislation, even (or perhaps especially) that provincial legislation that 
was clearly within provincial jurisdiction?
One answer to these questions was supplied by Mills himself when, as Minis­
ter of Justice in the Laurier cabinet between 1897 and 1902, he discharged the re­
sponsibility of vetting provincial legislation with a view to its disallowance. Con­
sidering Mills’ firmly held and frequently expressed view that disallowance ought 
to be abolished, it is curious that as Minister of Justice he considered the use of 
disallowance at all. Yet use it he did. In all, Mills was responsible for recom­
mending the disallowance of thirteen provincial and territorial acts in his tenure
as Minister of Justice, which is to say that he disallowed as many acts in his five 
years as Minister of Justice as his predecessors in the post had vetoed in the pre­
vious ten.85
The way in which Mills used the veto power is still more remarkable than the 
sheer number of laws disallowed, however. Mills’ patience was tested most sorely 
by the government of British Columbia, which passed a series of bills at the turn 
of the century that attempted to prohibit Asians either from immigrating to or 
working in British Columbia. In most cases, Mills seems to have proceeded on 
the traditional assumption that the federal government could legitimately in­
validate only those laws that were ultra vires the British Columbia legislature or 
were inconsistent with some more general federal policy. Thus when Mills was 
called upon to judge a B.C. law that effectively prohibited the immigration into 
the province of any person who could not write out an application “in the charac­
ters of some European language,” he did not hesitate to exercise the veto.86 Such 
educational requirements, he wrote, were simply “inconsistent with the general 
policy of the law” of the federal government.87 When, on the other hand, the B.C. 
Legislature acted in a way that was clearly within its exclusive jurisdiction, Mills 
penally stayed his hand. Having explained that the aforementioned immigration 
bill was repugnant to the federal government’s policy, Mills turned around in the 
same memorandum to explain that he could do nothing to blunt the effect of a 
sim ilarly discriminatory law that disenfranchised Chinese, Japanese and Indian 
voters in Vancouver municipal elections. “Such enactments,” he explained dryly, 
“are entirely local and domestic in their nature, and sufficiently justified, so far as 
the powers to be exercised by the government of Canada are concerned, by the 
fact that the local legislature has considered their provisions expedient or 
desirable.”88
In fact, however, Mills was neither able, nor it seems was he disposed, to con­
trive such a neat, jurisdictional rationale for every one of the B.C. acts that came 
to his attention. Mills’ duty as Minister of Justice in these cases was complicated 
by the fact that B.C. ’s legislation had elicited a formal diplomatic protest from 
the Japanese government against the province’s actions. Mills was under sig­
nificant pressure from the Foreign Office to prevent these provincial acts from 
jeopardizing Britain’s relations with Japan. In the course of disallowing two acts 
that sought to disqualify those of Japanese and Chinese extraction from being 
employed by provincial corporations, he essentially suggested to the government 
of B.C. that the disallowance of these acts was a small price to pay for “a friendly 
sentiment on the part of Japan in matters of commerce and otherwise.”89 The
tabulated  from the tables in Hod gins, Dominion and Provincial Legislation, vol. 1 (1867-18%) and
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B.C. laws might well have been ultra vires anyway as the legislation dealt with 
matters - immigration and the rights of aliens - on which the federal government 
has paramount authority. From Mills* point of view, however, the existence of 
dear imperial interests obviated any need for a detailed jurisdictional analysis 
along these lines. For the purposes of disallowance, it was suffident that the B.C. 
legislation conflicted with larger, imperial interests.
Yet by shifting the discussion over the B.C. laws from jurisdiction strictly 
speaking to the larger, political interests at stake, Mills also made it easier to in­
ject into the review of these laws the very considerations of justice that he had 
earlier argued were incompatible with the exercise of disallowance. For at the 
root of the Foreign Office’s fears that the B.C. legislation could poison British- 
Japanese relations, was the serious, and from Mills* perspective legitimate, com­
plaint that the B.C. laws discriminated gratuitously and unjustly against the rights 
of Japanese workers in the province. In his explanatory report to the B.C. 
government, Mills could easily have confined himself to a description of the real- 
politik of the situation, conduded that the B.C. legislation had to be sacrificed for 
the larger good of the Empire, and left it at that. He did not. He considered the 
premier of B.C. to be an “unscrupulous and dangerous” character; he seems per­
sonally to have disliked the B.C. policy; and as a result he apparently could not 
resist the temptation to read the B.C. government a lesson in liberalism.90 The 
problem with the legislation, he argued, was not merely that it threatened to be­
come an irritant in British-Japanese relations; the problem was that the legisla­
tion was “justly regarded as offensive by a friendly power.”91 In the end, Mills’ de­
cision to disallow some but not all of the acts on jurisdictional grounds clearly 
reflected the dilemma that he faced in attempting to find a balance between 
provincial sovereignty, the larger interests of the Empire, and what he called quite 
explidtly “the justice of the case.”92
Admittedly, it is easy to overstate the importance of such considerations of 
justice, of the rights of a minority subjected to systematic discrimination, in Mills’ 
calculations. These considerations were probably no more than an undercurrent 
in his discussion of the B.C. legislation, and Mills was himself ambivalent on the 
the question of equal rights for Asian immigrants. Still, given the very powerful 
pressure to exclude such considerations altogether from the discussion of dis­
allowance, even such an undercurrent is noteworthy. Moreover, when the issue 
was one which Mills considered to be morally unambiguous - protecting the rights 
of property for instance - the question of rights came to the fore.
The most striking example in this latter category concerns Mills’ threat to 
strike down an Ontario law that required companies not incorporated in Ontario 
to apply and pay for a license to do business in the province. Again, Mills could 
well have disposed of the Ontario law simply on jurisdicti mal grounds. As he put
90Mills Papers, Mills to Laurier, (18 May 1900).
91Hodgins, Dominion and Provincial Legislation at 556. Emphasis added.
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it in his official report to the Attorney General of Ontario, the Licensing Act 
arguably trenched both on the federal government’s authority to legislate for the 
“peace, order and good government of the country” and on its exclusive power to 
regulate trade and commerce; it flew in the face of several judicial precedents; 
and the Ontario Act was similar to several others that had already been dis­
allowed.93
What is curious, then, is that when the Premier of Ontario, George Ross, 
responded to Mills’ report with a promise to amend the sections that were juns- 
dictionally questionable, Mills rejoined by saying in effect that Mr. Ross had mis­
understood the federal government’s objections. “The question is not,” Mills 
wrote, “whether you have the power to tax Dominion corporations more than you 
do those of the local legislature, created for a similar purpose, but whether we 
ought to permit the policy of the Dominion to be frustrated by such unjust provin­
cial legislation.” The real objection to the Ontario law, therefore, was not that it 
exceeded provincial jurisdiction - although Mills was certainly suspicious of it on 
those grounds. The more basic problem, rather, was that it imposed a burden on 
companies incorporated under federal law that it did not impose on Ontario com­
panies, that it discriminated against federal corporations as if these were some­
how “foreign corporations.” Were the shoe on the other foot, were Ottawa to 
pass a similar licensing law that disadvantaged Ontario corporations, Mills was 
quite sure that Ontario “would at once cry out against our legislation, not because 
it was ultra vires, but because it would be unjust.” All the federal government was 
asking was that Ontario “recognize the principle of equality.” He concluded: “I 
think you see what my position is. The question of ultra vires in this matter is 
quite subordinate to the general question of public policy.”94
These opinions cannot easily be reconciled with the purely jurisdictional use 
of disallowance that was current in the 1870s, much less with Mills’ unconditional 
denunciation of disallowance that he made quite routinely in the 1880s. But it 
would be a mistake to conclude that Mills’ position was, on this evidence, either 
inexplicably contradictory or expediently self-serving. What Mills’ position brings 
to Ught, rather, is the enormous ambiguity of an analogical system that was meant 
to accommodate both provincial autonomy and the liberal protection of rights. 
The possibility that there might be an insoluble tension between the component 
parts of the system did not manifest itself as long as Mills could assume that 
provincial autonomy and liberal rights were mutually reinforcing; in effect, as 
long as Liberals controlled most provincial legislatures and Tories the federal 
Parliament. The possibility, post-1896, that provincial legislatures would act un­
justly and that he would be in a position as a federal minister to stop injustice m 
its tracks before and in preference to a legal challenge, forced him to consider 
violating the rule of law (in the form of provincial autonomy) in order to protect 
the rule of law (in the form of individual rights). That is the deep tension, not to 
say incoherence, in Mills’ Canadian application of the late-nineteenth-century un­
derstanding of the rule of law.
™Ibid. at 17-18.
94Ibid. at 26-27.
VThe tension in Mills’ thought between federalism and liberalism helps to explain 
the curious evolution of the power of disallowance; it also sheds light on the con­
temporary debate over the implications of the Charter of Rights for tiie preserva­
tion of community and liberty. One of the most subtle and provocative analyses 
of the Charter’s meaning in this regard is Charles Taylor’s recent contribution to 
the series of research reports published in conjunction with the McDonald Com­
mission, an essay entitled “Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Aliena­
tion in Late Twentieth Century Canada.”95 Taylor is concerned with, in the Cana­
dian context, the “malaise of modernity” which in one form or another and to one 
degree or another seems to afflict all modern societies. By modern, Taylor 
means societies centrally dedicated to the maximization of freedom understood in 
two distinct, and not perfectly compatible, ways. The first meaning of freedom, 
associated especially with the classical liberalism expounded by philosophers like 
John Locke, focuses on individuals as rational, independent agents “who discover 
their purposes in themselves” rather than seeing themselves as “part of some cos­
mic order, where their nature was to be understood by their relation to that or­
der.”96 What follows from this definition of freedom as self-definition is that “as 
a free subject, one is owed respect for one’s rights and has certain guaranteed 
freedoms.” The condition of freedom thus understood is that one “must be able 
to choose and act, within limits, free from arbitrary interference of others.” The 
“modern subject,” in short, “is an equal bearer of rights. This status is part of 
what sustains his identity.”97
' But if freedom has often been defined as bearing rights and centred on the 
individual, there is another sense of modern freedom which is better defined as 
self-governance and which has centred on the community. “The fact that we gov­
ern ourselves is an important part of our dignity as free subjects.” But this defini­
tion of freedom as self-governance leads in quite a different direction than the 
first definition for it suggests that “the modem subject.. .  is far from being an in­
dependent, atomic agent.” On the contrary, “an individual is sustained.. .  by the 
culture which elaborates and maintains the vocabulary of his or her self- 
understanding.”9^  The full realization of freedom so understood can only be 
achieved through identification with the community and participation as a citizen.
These two definitions of freedom - as individual rights and citizen participa­
tion - have co-existed in some form of dynamic balance since they were first ex­
pounded during the Enlightenment; there is nothing new in this. What is distinc­
tive about the situation that we face in the late twentieth century, according to 
Taylor, is that the individualistic, atomistic, rights-based dim«n«n«i of modern lib­
MCharies Taylor, “Alternative Futures” supra, note 1. 
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eralism has begun to crowd out or threaten the “community” dimension.* This 
threat can be illustrated in a number of ways. The demand for greater individual 
freedom, defined especially in terms of material well-being, requires, among 
other things, a population that is mobile; a government that can provide a wide 
range of services efficiently and that operates a welfare system to mitigate the ef­
fects of economic dislocation and historical patterns of discrimination; the con­
centration of public and private energies to distribute goods and opportunities ef­
ficiently; and a system of courts which will protect rights “even against the process 
of collective decision-making of the society, against the majority will, or the 
prevailing consensus.”1”  Yet as Taylor points out, these conditions of individual 
freedom serve to undermine community. Mobility destroys the fabric of stable, 
traditional communities; the need to provide services creates bureaucratized, 
largely unaccountable, government; the “ culture of rights” effectively 
“circumvent(s) majority decision making through court judgments” and so 
“further entrenches taking a distance from community decision-making”; and 
concentration creates the sort of centralization that makes citizenship remote and 
participation difficult and unrewarding.101 The result - perhaps most plainly evi­
dent in the United States - is governmental overload, ungovernability, litigious­
ness and a decline in even the most routine forms of citizen participation. 
“Looked at in the light of the full demands of the modern identity,” Taylor con­
cludes, “the atrophy of citizen power negates an important dimension of our dig­
nity as free agents, and hence poses a potential long-term threat to the legitimacy 
of a modern society.”102
The alternative to these modern strains and tensions, Taylor argues, is not to 
abandon modernity (which is probably impossible anyway), but to revitalize the 
other side of the modern project, what he calls the “participatory model,” which 
stresses decentralization, political participation, attachment to community and the 
democratic protection of liberty. Taylor clearly endorses the participatory model 
as a matter of principle. More importantly, he argues that it is particularly well 
suited to Canada where, he says, “the sense of citizen dignity” has tended histori­
cally “to take the participatory rather than the rights forms” and where there is a 
long history of regional resistance to centralization.109
It is here that Taylor allies himself most closely with what Richard Simeon 
and others have called the provindalist understanding of Canada. For like the 
provincialists who opposed the entrenchment of a Charter of Rights on the 
grounds that it would undermine the integrity of local decision-making, Taylor is 
careful to tie the preference for greater decentralization to democratic or 
participatory aspirations. Decentralization is desirable because it offers the best 






model in Canada,” he argues, “of the continued health of our practices of self- 
rule, depends on our continuing resistance to centralization.. .  .”:
If our aim is to combat, rather than adjust to, the trends to growth, concentration 
and mobility, and the attendant bureaucratic opacity and rigidity of representa­
tive democracy, then some measures of decentralization are indispensable, with 
the consequent strengthening of more localized, smaller-scale units of self- 
rule.104
In the end, Taylor sketches this choice for Canada:
In a sense, to oversimplify and dramatize, we can see two package solutions 
emerging out of the mists to the problem of sustaining a viable modem polity in 
the late twentieth centuiy. One is the route of political centralization, at the cost 
of some citizen alienation but compensated for by an increasing incorporation of 
the American model in which dignity finds political expression in the defense of 
rights. The other is the route of continued decentralization, and a continued at­
tempt to maintain and extend our historic partidpatoiy model, at the cost of put­
ting a greater and greater strain on political vision and inventiveness through me­
chanisms of political coordination.105
Taylor’s preference is dear. “If we look at Canada’s future...  in terms of the way 
this country can best face the strains of modernity and the dangers of political 
breakdown implicit in them - then there seems no doubt that the centralizing 
solution would be an immensely regressive step.”106 Apart from everything else, 
Taylor concludes that some basic commitment to decentralized authority “is 
more in line with our traditional political culture.”107 Indeed, “the strength of our 
historic regional societies makes it virtually mandatory for us to practise a more 
decentralized style of government than other comparable federations.”108
Taylor’s defence of the participatory model of politics is extremely attractive, 
but it succeeds, I believe, only at the cost of distorting the historical tradition that 
is meant to sustain it. Taylor would have us believe that one of the reasons that a 
participatory form of politics is accessible to Canadians in a way that it may not 
be to Americans is that our political tradition, rooted in regional self-government, 
has historically “been more identified with the participatory model,” while “the 
habit of litigation, and the elements of atomist consciousness that go along with it, 
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Yet even with the necessary qualifications, this characterization of provin­
cialism in Canada, much less the Canadian-American contrast, is overdrawn. For 
one thing, it is by no means dear that the “continuing resistance to centraliza­
tion” in Canada has in fact been undertaken with a view to preserving and 
promoting greater citizen participation or that it serves as an historical precedent 
for the “participatory model” on which Taylor would have us build. For the 
fact is that the intellectual strategy of the provincial rights movement, the earliest 
and most successful example of resistance to centralization in English Canada, 
entailed a basic ambivalence, if not hostility, to the ideal of full democratic partic­
ipation of the sort Taylor thinks desirable. The core idea that informed the legal 
understanding of provincial autonomy, after all, was to put jurisdiction first. 
What mattered was not whether the provincial or federal governments acted well 
or wisely, but merely whether they acted permissibly or legally, within the bound­
aries of their jurisdiction. This was the crucial condition of autonomy and every­
thing, including a broader form of political discussion, fell to it. In the 
autonomists* legal mind the defence of autonomy depended on treating the dis­
cussion of the most controversial issues as if they raised only jurisdictional ques­
tions that could be discussed and resolved in terms of rights. The integrity of 
provincial communities depended, more specifically, on separating law and 
politics as far as possible; on separating the question of whether a measure was 
“wise or unwise, expedient or inexpedient,” from the legal question of whether a 
given legislature had the jurisdictional right or capacity to act.111
What followed was a system of constitutional rules in which the federal 
government was meant to be barred not only from acting in areas of provincial 
jurisdiction, but in which political discussion was reduced to and centred on the 
determination of jurisdiction. It was a system in which jurisdictional them­
selves were not really to be discussed so much as derived from the black letter 
text of the Constitution - and this by courts not representative bodies. And to the 
extent that jurisdiction was unclear and a matter for debate, it was a system m 
which both levels of government soon learned that jurisdictional uncertainty pro^ 
vided a good pretext for refusing to address issues that divided the electorate. 
Despite their liberal “creed that a wise decision can only be arrived at through 
the discussion of it from every point of view,” the autonomists’ scrupulous atten­
tion to the defence of provincial autonomy made them limit and narrow discus­
sion - in precisely the way that Taylor says discussion is narrowed when political 
questions are discussed in terms of rights.113 The provincial autonomists m 
Ontario, in sum, insisted on defending their claims in the very language that 
Taylor associates with the “rights model,” and to that extent their conception ot
mIbuL at 221.
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politics suffered from some of the very symptoms that a participatory form of 
decentralized power is meant to cure.114
Put slightly differently, it is not entirely dear that the prindples on which 
provincialism has rested historically are as hostile to the “rights model” as 
Taylor’s depiction of these “two packages” would imply. Beneath the important 
superficial differences there is actually a deep affinity between the Haim for 
provindal autonomy mediated by the rule of law and Taylor’s “rights model.” At 
the level of political rhetoric, for instance, it is useful to remember that provincial 
governments still couch their claims to power in terms of rights, and they still re­
inforce these daims by comparing provincial rights to individual rights.115 It is 
possible that one of the reasons that Canadians accepted the idea of an 
entrenched Charter o f Rights so readily is that the long-standing debate over 
provindal rights had long since inured them to the usefulness and attractiveness 
of the language of rights, of legal boundaries, and of courts as impartial arbiters.
There is a still deeper, substantive affinity here between the historical pursuit 
of provincial autonomy and the “rights model” that Taylor slights. If the provin- 
dal autonomists were successful in protecting the integrity and sovereignty of lo­
cal self-government, the record suggests that they neither could nor wanted to 
disentangle themselves completely from the liberal regard for the protection of 
individual freedom that informed the vision of the rule of law. To the extent that 
the provindal autonomists were liberals, therefore, it is arguable that in legitimiz­
ing a rights model of federalism the provincial autonomists both protected 
provincial power and actually laid the conceptual groundwork for the Charter of 
Rights that places substantive limits on provincial power; that the Charter 
represents the fulfilment of the liberal premises that informed the movement for 
provincial autonomy, in a way, however, that is not necessarily congenial to 
provindal autonomy; in sum, that the Charter follows in the tradition of, and is the 
better alternative to, the power of disallowance as a way of protecting individual 
rights.
Taylor is surely right to say that the problem of com m unity  remains the cru- 
dal, unresolved question facing Canadians. He is probably right, as well, that as
114I have elaborated on this point in “Constitutional Politics and the Legacy of the Provincial Rights 
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ural resources, both Alberta’s Peter Lougheed and Saskatchewan’s Allan Blakeney compared the 
provincial governments’ position to that of (individual) property owners who simply wanted to vindi­
cate the rights of the owner,” including the “right to receive value for the resource as a com­
modity.” (Proceedings of the First Ministers’ Conference on the Constitution, September 1980; 
Premier Lougheed at 119-120). As Premier Blakeney put it: “Ownership by a province becomes im­
portant, then, because it allows a province to do all those things that any owner can do. . . . ” 
(Saskatchewan position paper, 12; emphasis added). Premier Lougheed drew out the analogy again 
in stating Alberta’s position on changes to the amending formula. The priority of his government, 
he said, was for an amending formula “that protects us against the rights of the tyranny of the ma­
jority” (Proceedings, 124). 3 3
long as it remains unresolved, there is bound to be a decentralizing impulse in 
PanaHian politics that will always distinguish it from American politics. But it is 
too simple, even if attractive, to picture the alternative futures of Canada as rest­
ing on a choice between “two packages” - one decentralized and participatory, 
the other centralist and rights-oriented. The truth is that these visions cannot be 
so easily “packaged” or disentangled from a history in which each is implicated in 
the other. Like it or not, the Charter of Rights, and more recently the Meech 
Lake Accord, are in all their awkwardness a fair representation of the various tra­
ditions from which they have grown. The attempt to preserve rights while allow­
ing legislatures to override them under certain circumstances; the attempt to pro­
tect minority linguistic rights across the country while acknowledging that Quebec 
is a distinct society, the attempt to protect mobility while allowing provinces to 
prefer their own citizens if need be; the declaration that rights are fundamental 
but also, and explicitly, subject to reasonable limitation - all of this reflects not 
merely a compromise between two visions of Canada, but the extent to which 
each vision entails or is parasitic upon the other.116 What we are left with is not a 
choice between our history and our future, between our more participatory tradi­
tion and the modern malaise, between 1867 and 1776. We are left, rather, with 
two visions of Canada produced, bound inextricably together and held in tension 
by our history. The challenge is to find principles that will allow the different 
strands of the Canadian constitutional tradition to grow and intertwine from their 
common source.
116For an argument along these lines, see Patrick Macklem, “Constitutional Ideologies (1988) 20 
Ottawa L. Rev. at 117-156.
